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ARTICLES 
NOT ALL DEFINED VALUE CLAUSES ARE EQUAL 
Wendy C. Gerzog * 
Abstract 
Defined value clauses, used to value nonmarketable family limited 
partnership (FLP) interests, create valuation distortions and other public 
policy issues. This article describes these abuses and proposes the 
employment of restrictions similar to those applied to pecuniary formula 
marital deduction clauses. 
This article explains how pecuniary formula marital deduction 
provisions created valuation distortions by allowing for undervaluation of 
the marital share that were remedied by the IRS's Rev. Proc. 64-19 and the 
enactment of § 2056(b)(1 0). Additionally, this article analyzes recent case 
law expanding the use of defined value clauses into the FLP area and 
criticizes the courts for not applying the public policy doctrines of Procter 
and Robinette to those cases. This article also distinguishes defined 
valuation clauses in the FLP context and shows how all fixed value clauses 
are not equivalent. Finally, this article proposes solutions for overcoming 
the valuation distortions that these clauses create . 
• Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. This article was supported by a generous 
summer research grant from the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
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Estate planners routinely employ defined value clauses to coordinate 
the value of the exemption amount l at a decedent's death and the amount 
set aside to qualify for the marital deduction. 2 Since documents are not 
usually drafted immediately before a decedent's death, no one can know the 
exemption amount that will be current law at that time? Likewise, the other 
elements in the calculation of the marital deduction can only be estimated 
before decedent's death.4 
Defined value clauses in the context of marital deduction/exemption 
drafting and planning have been subject to potential abuse. Because the 
marital deduction provides only delayed taxation, whereas the exemption 
permanently shelters assets from transfer tax, estate planners drafted 
defined value clauses to freeze the amount that qualified for the marital 
deduction. Likewise, planners would fund the sheltered exemption portion 
with appreciating assets while funding the marital deduction trust with 
assets that had depreciated between decedent's death and the time of 
funding. Over the years, those attempts at marital deduction/exemption dis-
tortion have been thwarted both by agency restrictions5 and by legislation.6 
Assets transferred either during the decedent's lifetime or at death are 
valued at fair market value, respectively, at the date of gift7 or at decedent's 
date of death.8 Fair market value is defined as what a hypothetical buyer 
would pay and a seller would charge for an asset, with both having 
I In this article I refer to exemption amount to refer to the exemption equivalent credit that has 
been in effect since 1976. For the difference between an exemption (deduction) and an exemption 
equivalent credit, see JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: 
LAW AND PLANNING 33 (2011). 
2 While the coordination is mainly between those two untaxed properties or funds, calculating the 
amount of the marital deduction requires also factoring in other deductible items (e.g., charitable 
donations, administrative expenses, claims against the estate, mortgages, state death taxes). 
3 Likewise, it would be impossible to know the size of the decedent's estate or the value of the 
other elements factored into the calculation. See supra note 2 for a description ofthe additional elements 
factored into the calculation. 
4 For example, the values of assets included in decedent's estate and decedent's expenses 
normally fluctuate day to day. See supra note 2. 
5 Rev. Proc. 64·19,1964·1 C.B. 682 [hereinafter Rev. Proc. 64·19]. 
6 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(IO). 
7 I.R.C. § 25 I 2(a). 
8 I.R.C. § 2031(a). 
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reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts and neither being under 
compulsion to buy or to sell.9 Most assets are valued by a facts and circum-
stances showing of value whereby the transferor has the burden of proof. 10 
Because nonmarketable property interests are not easily valued, a 
transferor typically employs experts to sustain that burden. II Lately, 
transferors are increasingly relying on defined value clauses to limit the 
value of their transfers of nonmarketable assets.12 
To date, the abuse potential of defined value clauses in the context of a 
family limited partnership (FLP) has not been properly addressed. The 
courts have not applied Robinette 13 or Procter 14 as they should have. 
Treasury has not issued regulations imposing requirements similar to those 
that Congress imposed with respect to marital deduction defined value 
clauses or those required by Treasury in the context of marital deduction 
funding formulas. Congress has not dealt with the fundamental valuation 
distortion of FLPs; therefore, not surprisingly, Congress has not concerned 
itself with the increased valuation distortion issues created by recent court 
decisions l5 in the context of defined value clauses and FLPs. 
1. THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND DISTORTION PROTECTION 
A. Funding Distortions: Rev. Proc. 64-19 
Before Rev. Proc. 64-19, estate planners typically employed a 
valuation distortion technique utilizing a defined value clause to freeze the 
marital deduction share. Before the revenue procedure, they would draft the 
9 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-I(b)(1954). 
10 Partial, temporal property interests, such as remainders or annuities, must be valued by the 
actuarial tables. I.R.C. § 7520(a). See also Wendy C. Gerzog, Annuity Tables Versus Factually Based 
Estate Tax Valuation: Ithaca Trust Re-visited, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 745 (2004), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfrn?abstracUd=532062. 
II See, e.g., I.R.S. Field Servo Adv. 2001-43-004 (Oct. 26,2001); JOHN A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL 
TAX VALUATION § 4.04 (1996 & Supp. 2003); all cases cited infra Part III. 
12 See Estate of Petter V. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 534, 541-42, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-
280 (2009), aff d, 653 F.3d \0 12 (9th Cir. 20 II). 
13 Robinette V. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (\ 943). 
14 Comm'r V. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944). 
15 See infra Parts II & III. 
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transfer to a spouse as a pecuniary bequest (i.e., a fixed dollar amount),16 
funded with assets valued at decedent's date of death or an alternate 
valuation date. When the decedent died, the marital share was funded with 
assets that had depreciated from decedent's valuation date values. This 
technique allowed the marital gift to be less than the amount of the marital 
deduction claimed on decedent's estate tax return. 17 
Prior to the issuance of Rev. Proc. 64-19, some estate planning instruments 
attempted to provide additional tax planning flexibility by permitting assets 
distributed in satisfaction of a pecuniary gift to be valued at their estate tax 
values. There was no gain or loss on such an allocation because the assets were 
deemed to have a basis equal to their federal estate tax value. However, the 
significant aspect of this approach was that it allowed fiduciaries to allocate 
depreciating assets entirely to the marital share and appreciating assets to the 
nonmarital portion. The obvious purpose was a reduction of the value in the 
surviving spouse's estate. IS 
In 1964, the government issued its revenue procedure,19 which 
"represents a compromise the government reached with representatives of 
the American Bar Association in recognition by all that an abuse existed 
under prior practice.,,20 Under the revenue procedure, a pecuniary bequest21 
16 See 2 EDWARD F. KOREN & ROBERT H. WALTUCH, ESTATE TAX & PERSONAL FINANCIAL 
PLANNING § 21:59 (2012) ("A pecuniary formula is a devise ofa fixed amount, rather than a percentage 
of the testator's estate."). 
17 KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION: STRATEGIES AND 
SOLUTIONS ~ 49.02[2][a] (Warren, Gorham & Lamont of RIA, abridged student ed. 2003). See KOREN 
& W ALTUCH, supra note 16. 
18 3 MONICA DELL'OSSO & FRAYDA 1. BRUTON, CALIFORNIA TRANSACTIONS FORMS-EsTATE 
PLANNING § 15:46 (2012). 
19 The revenue procedure is applicable to instruments executed on or after October 1,1964. Rev. 
Proc. 64-19, supra note 5, § 3.01. The marital deduction may be allowed for an instrument executed 
before that date if the IRS receives an agreement from the fiduciary and the surviving spouse stating that 
the assets of the estate, both cash and other property available for distribution, will be distributed 
according to the requirements of the revenue procedure, so that the cash and other property distributed 
in satisfaction of the marital deduction pecuniary bequest will be fairly representative of the net 
appreciation or depreciation in the value of the available property on the date or dates of distribution. Id. 
If the fiduciary fails to comply under this agreement and the value distributed is less than required, there 
will be a deemed gift from the surviving spouse to the beneficiaries of the amount of that failure unless 
the surviving spouse, on being informed, promptly takes steps to remedy the shortcoming.ld. § 3.02. 
20 Jeffrey N. Pennell, Estate Tax Marital Deduction, 843 TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) Vll-E n.859 
(2007). See STANLEY S. SURREY ET AL. FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 865 (Foundation Press 1987). The government described its purpose in promulgating the 
revenue procedure: "The purpose of this Revenue Procedure is to state the position of the Internal 
Revenue Service relative to allowance of the marital deduction in cases where there is some uncertainty 
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does not qualify for the marital deduction unless the aggregate assets, when 
distributed, have a value not less than the marital deduction claimed 
amount, or unless the fiduciary must distribute assets with date of 
distribution values that are fairly representative of appreciation and 
depreciation occurring between the estate tax valuation date and the 
distribution date.22 Each method was intended to remove discretion from 
the executor to fund the marital bequest with assets having a 
disproportionately large amount of depreciation (or little appreciation) 
during the estate tax valuation and distribution dates.23 However, the 
fiduciary may not be able to choose between the two approaches, which are 
also known respectively as "minimum worth" and "fairly representative" 
funding?4 
as to the ultimate distribution to be made in payment of a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust where 
the governing instrument provides that the executor or trustee may satisty bequests in kind with assets at 
their value as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes." Rev. Proc. 64-19, supra note 5, § I. 
21 Rev. Proc. 64-19, supra note 5, § 2.01 ("The Internal Revenue Service has received inquiries 
concerning the amount of the marital deduction which should be allowed for a pecuniary bequest in a 
will or for a transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount where the governing instrument not only provides 
that the executor or trustee may, or is required to, select assets in kind to satisty the bequest or transfer, 
but also provides that any assets distributed in kind shall be valued at their values as finally determined 
for Federal estate tax purposes. The question is the same whether the amount of the bequest or transfer 
is determined by a formula fixing it by reference to the adjusted gross estate of the decedent as finally 
determined for Federal estate tax purposes, or its amount is determined in some other fashion by which a 
fixed dollar amount distributable to the surviving spouse can be computed. Any bequest or transfer in 
trust described in subsection 2.0 I is hereinafter referred to as a 'pecuniary bequest or transfer' for 
purposes of this Revenue Procedure."). 
22Id. § 2.02. 
23 HENKEL, supra note 17. To illustrate the effect of the revenue procedure: "Sam died in 1997 
with an estate of $1,000,000 consisting of real estate valued at $600,000 and a business valued at 
$400,000. Sam's will gives his wife, Tammy, an amount which is necessary to reduce his taxable estate 
to zero. Prior to funding the bequest to Tammy, the real estate increases in value to $1,000,000 and the 
business decreases in value to $100,000. If Sam's executor could use federal estate tax values and give 
the business to Tammy as her share of the estate and the real estate to the bypass trust, he has 
significantly affected the amount of property given to Tammy. If the individual's will allows the 
Executor to fund the marital share with property at its estate tax value after the property has 
substantially depreciated in value, then the IRS says the marital bequest does not quality for the marital 
deduction." RONALD R. CRESSWELL ET AL., 4 TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATE 
PLANNING § 12:61 (Thomson Reuters/West 2008). 
24 DELL'OSSO & BRUTON, supra note 18. After the IRS issued Rev. Proc. 64-19, the fairly 
representative formula and fixed sum or date of distribution formula became more common. See KOREN 
& WAL TUCH, supra note 16. An example of the fairly representative date of distribution formula clauses 
is: "In determining the amount of this devise, the values as finally determined for federal estate tax 
purposes are to be used. In distributing the assets to satisty this devise, however, the personal 
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Essentially, through the revenue procedure, "[t]he IRS prescribed rules 
to prevent manipUlation of the amount which was transferred in satisfaction 
of the marital bequest when a pecuniary formula was used.,,25 Otherwise, 
without such safeguards, the interest "passing from the decedent to his 
surviving spouse would not be ascertainable as of the [decedent's] date of 
death, if the property available for distribution included assets which might 
fluctuate in value. ,,26 
The revenue procedure does not apply to pro rata fractional marital 
deduction formulas. 27 That is because "fractionalization of each asset auto-
matically works to ratably apportion all appreciation and depreciation.,,28 
Likewise, the procedure specifically states that the problem it addresses is 
not one attached to a transfer of specific assets, a transfer of cash, a pecu-
niary bequest where the fiduciary has no choice of which assets are to be 
distributed in kind, or a pecuniary bequest satisfied with date of distribution 
values?9 Many states have statutes to cure certain non-complying instrument 
provisions to adhere to the revenue procedure requirements.3o 
Since 1964, estate planners must heed the requirements of this revenue 
procedure if they wish to employ a pecuniary formula clause and have that 
provision qualify for the marital deduction. With the procedure's 
restrictions, all marital deduction funding formulas have advantages and 
disadvantages. Within that framework, the estate planner weighs different 
representative shall select assets, including cash, that are fairly representative of the appreciation or 
depreciation in the value of all property available for distribution, based on fair market values of these 
properties on the date or dates of distribution." [d. § 21 :60. 
25 CRESSWELL ET AL., supra note 23. 
26 Rev. Proc. 64-19, supra note 5, § 2.03. Likewise, according to the government, the marital 
interest, which could be destroyed or reduced, would constitute a nondeductible terminable interest. See 
the government's argument in Estate of Hamelsky v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 741 (1972), which the court 
rejected. 
27 Rev. Proc. 64·19, supra note 5, § 4.01. 
28 Pennell, supra note 20, § 1.2.b. See SURREY ET AL., supra note 20, at 866. 
29 Rev. Proc. 64-19, supra note 5, § 4.01. 
30 See George A. Wilson, State Law Considerations Relevant to Choice of Domicile-Intestate 
Succession, in 2 ESTATE TAX & PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING § 20:6 (Edward F. Koren ed., 
Thomson/West 2012). 
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factors31 and chooses the alternative most appropriate for each client; 
however, since Rev. Proc. 64-19, no one may use a pecuniary defined value 
clause to create the valuation distortions rampant before its promulgation?2 
B. The Marital Deduction: Definition of Specific Portion 
Congress enacted the marital deduction in 1948 33 in order to give 
married couples in common law states tax treatment comparable to that 
available to couples in community property states who by law own 50% of 
the couple's marital assets~4 Since 1981,35 the marital deduction is unlimited 
in amoune6 and is intended to reflect that a husband and wife are treated as 
one unit for the purposes of transfer taxation,37 a decision paralleling their 
income tax treatment. 38 
31 Factors include the possibility of triggering gain or loss, overfunding the marital share, the need 
to revalue assets, complexity of calculations, accelerating LR.D. (income in respect of a decedent), 
GSTT (generation skipping transfer tax) exemption planning, and DNI concerns. See Sebastian V. 
Grassi, Jr., A Summary, a Checklist, and a Chart of Marital Deduction Formulas, PROB. & PROP., 
January/February 2005, at 32, 34. 
32 See Pennell, supra note 20, § M. 
33 Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat. I 10, 117. 
34 H.R. REp. No. 80-1274, at 24-26 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 241, 260-61; S. REp. No. 
80-1013, at 26-29, reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 285, 301. 
35 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d)(I), 95 Stat. 172,302-03 
[hereinafter ERTA]. §§ 403(a)(I)(B), (b)(I) (amending LR.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (1954». 
36 LR.C. § 2056(a). ERTA, supra note 35, § 403(a)(I)(A) repealed LR.C. § 2056(c) (1954), which 
contained the dollar and percentage limitations placed on the deduction. The adoption of the unlimited 
marital deduction and the married couple as the unit of estate and gift taxation has rarely been criticized 
by scholars or practitioners. See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 123 
(1990) (remarking on the lack of criticism of these 198 I changes). 
37 See Joseph Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable Transfers, and the 
Marital Deduction, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,32 (1984) ("Viewed broadly, the unlimited marital deduction 
has the effect of treating spouses as a single taxpayer with a lifetime equal to the survivor'S."). 
38 Beginning in 1948, husbands and wives were able to file joint returns and split their income 
between them. See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168,62 Stat. 110, I IS. After the ERTA enactment of the 
unlimited marital deduction, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 provided that transfers between spouses, and 
ex-spouses, whether or not for adequate and bona fide consideration, are treated as gifts for income tax 
purposes, with no gain or loss recognized and with the property given a carry-over basis. See Tax 
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494, 793 (codified as amended at I.R.C. 
§ 1041(a), (b) (1984». The Joint Committee Explanation states: "The Congress believes that, in general, 
it is inappropriate to tax transfers between spouses. This policy is already reflected in the Code rule that 
exempts marital gifts from the gift tax, and reflects the fact that a husband and wife are a single 
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In order to qualify for the marital deduction, the property must pass 
from the decedent to his or her surviving spouse,39 must be includible in the 
decedent's gross estate,40 and must not be a non-deductible terminable 
interest.41 There are statutory exceptions to the terminable interest rule.42 
Those statutory exceptions, however, include safeguards that prevent the 
property from evading transfer taxation.43 The marital deduction is intended 
merely to defer the incidence of transfer taxation until it leaves the marital 
unit. The statutory exceptions are not intended to provide a double 
deduction for the same interest in each spouse's estate.44 
One type of valuation distortion was implicitly condoned when the 
Supreme Court decided Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank45 wherein 
taxpayers challenged the definition of "specific portion" in the regula-
tions.46 "Specific portion" in this case applied a fixed dollar amount only to 
the income interest in a power of appointment trust (PAT) and not to the 
remainder interest subject to the surv1vmg spouse's power of 
appointment.47 However, the case opened the door to abuse because the 
term "specific portion" in the statute is a descriptive requirement of both the 
income interest and the property itself. That is, although the facts of this 
case did not apply to the amount included in the surviving spouse's estate 
(because the power of appointment referred to all of the property in the 
trust), when the same term exists in both parts of the same sentence in the 
same statute, estate planners would surely cite Northeastern Pennsylvania 
economic unit." JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 710 (Comm. Print 1984). 
391.R.C. § 2056( c). 
40 LR.C. § 2056(a). 
41 LR.C. §§ 2056(b); 2523 (bHg). 
42 LR.C. §§ 2056(b)(3), (5) (a power of appointment trust (PAT», (6), (7) (a qualified terminable 
interest property (QTIP) trust), (8), 2523(d), (e) (PAT), (t) (QTIP), (g). 
43 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2519, 2044. 
44 See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(9), 2523(h). 
45 Ne. Pa. Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967). 
46 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (2004) (requiring a specific portion be expressed as a 
fractional or percentile share). 
47 Ne. Pa. Nat'! Bank, 387 U.S. at 215 ("The will provided that his widow should receive $300 
per month until decedent's youngest child reached 18, and $350 per month thereafter."). 
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National Bank as authority to employ a fixed dollar amount to a "specific 
portion" of the property subject to the surviving spouse's power of 
appointment and it is that effect that resulted in abuse. 
Assume a trust estate of $200,000, with the widow receiving the right to the 
income from $100,000 of its corpus and a power of appointment over that 
$100,000, and the children of the testator receiving income from the balance of 
the corpus during the widow's life, their remainders to vest when she dies. Now 
suppose that when the widow dies the trust corpus has doubled in value to 
$400,000. The wife's power of appointment over $100,000 applies only to make 
$100,000 taxable to her estate. The remaining $300,000 passes tax free to the 
children.48 
In Estate of Alexander,49 the warning in Justice Stewart's dissent came 
to pass. In that case, the decedent's will provided a marital deduction 
formula clause: "This amount, which was a specific dollar amount, was to 
be approximately equal to the maximum Federal estate tax marital 
deduction allowable in determining the decedent's taxable estate.,,50 With 
the decedent's adjusted gross estate valued at $1,078,608.54, the widow 
received half of that value, "or $539,304.27, minus the value of items that 
passed directly to [the widow] that qualified for the marital deduction, 
$36,755, plus $10,000, for a total fixed dollar amount of$512,549.27.,,51 
Significantly, the widow was also given a testamentary power of 
appointment over that same fixed dollar amount, which was frozen at the 
48 Id. at 227 (Stewart, 1., dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent emphasized that such 
treatment would be unfair to surviving spouses in community property states who would have to include 
one-half of the appreciation in their estates at their subsequent deaths. "Thus, the Court's interpretation 
of 'specific portion' affords common-law estates a significant tax advantage that community property 
dispositions cannot obtain." Id. The dissent concluded by criticizing the uncertainty among estate 
planners that the majority's holding would cause by invalidating a regulation in force for ten years. Id. at 
229-30. 
49 Estate of Alexander v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 34 (1984), ajJ'd mem., 760 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1985). 
50Id. at 36. 
Specifically, the will provided that the--'Wife's share was to be an amount equal to the 
maximum estate tax marital deduction (allowable in determining the Federal estate tax on 
the gross estate) plus the sum of ten thousand dollars, diminished by the value for Federal 
estate tax purposes of all other items in my gross estate, which qualifY for the marital 
deduction and which pass or have passed to my wife .... ' 
Id. at 35 n.!. 
51Id. n.2. 
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decedent's death.52 The Tax Court held that the Supreme Court had already 
decided the issue in Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank when it 
interpreted that "specific portion" of income could be expressed as a fixed 
dollar amount. In so holding, the Tax Court stated that "Congress used the 
same words 'specific portion,' which we find to be unambiguous, in stating 
the requirements with respect to both income and corpus to qualify for the 
marital deduction. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that Congress 
intended a different meaning to apply to the two categories.,,53 While Judge 
Chabot concurred in Estate of Alexander, he had misgivings that the 
decision was bad tax policy.54 Judge Simpson, in his dissent, stated that the 
Supreme Court expressly limited its decision to the income interest and not 
to the corpus: "The Court was aware that in considering a limited power 
over corpus, different questions would arise, and the Court, explicitly and 
directly, told us that it was not deciding the corpus question and in effect 
directed us to consider that question separately on its merits.,,55 Although 
the government argued "that to conclude that the power to appoint a fixed 
dollar amount of corpus to qualify for the marital deduction would permit 
appreciation in the corpus to escape taxation altogether,,,56 the court was not 
persuaded that this valuation distortion was a significant problem.57 
52 [d. n.4. 
53 [d. at 43. 
54[d. at 45 (Chabot, J., concurring) ("Notwithstanding my concern that this interpretation may be 
bad tax policy (see the dissenting opinion of Simpson, J., infra), I agree that we are obligated to give the 
same content to each appearance of a term when the term appears twice in a single sentence, unless the 
statute itself (or perhaps unambiguous legislative history) gives clear instructions that the term is to have 
different meanings. "). 
55 Estate of Alexander, 82 T.C. at 50. Judge Simpson proceeded to state: 
Permitting a bequest of the income from a specific amount of corpus to qualifY for the 
marital deduction does no violence to the congressional scheme of equality, but applying a 
similar rule to the corpus of a trust will frustrate the clear and important objective of 
equality of treatment of residents of community property and common law States. To carry 
out that objective, we must construe 'specific portion,' when applied to a power over 
corpus, to be limited in the manner prescribed by the regulations. 
[d. Judges Dawson and Parker agreed with Judge Simpson's dissenting opinion. [d. at 51. 
56 [d. at 44. 
57 In the FLP context, likewise, courts continue to underestimate the value distortion problem 
with defined value clauses. See Estate of Christiansen v. Comm'r, 586 F.3d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 2009) 
("[W]e agree with the Commissioner that the Tax Court's ruling in this case may marginally detract 
from the incentive to audit estate tax returns.") (emphasis added), ajJ'g 130 T.C. I (2008); Estate of 
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With the 1981 enactment of the unlimited marital deduction and the 
qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) provision election,58 taxpayer 
use of this type of defined value clause grew.59 Essentially, under Estate of 
Alexander, when a surviving spouse held a power of appointment over a 
specific portion of the property in a PAT or when, as executor, she elected 
to make a QTIP election with respect to a dollar amount in the QTIP trust at 
her husband's death, the fixed dollar figure would freeze the amount subject 
to transfer tax. In both instances, the surviving spouse merely included the 
same fixed dollar amount in her estate.60 By contrast, under the govern-
ment's regulation, invalidated by Estate of Alexander,61 when a specific 
portion must be expressed as a fractional or percentage share of the trust, 
the surviving spouse would have to include any appreciation that occurred 
between the decedent's and the surviving spouse's deaths. Without that 
regulation, after Estate of Alexander, there was no statute or other authority 
that required such inclusion at either the decedent's death (since no 
appreciation exists at that time) or at the surviving spouse's death (because 
the inclusion statutes would not apply to any of that appreciation). After 
Estate of Alexander, therefore, there was no safeguard to prevent this 
Petter v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 544, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-280 (2009) ("The formulas used 
to effect these transfers were not void as contrary to public policy, as there was no 'severe and 
immediate' frustration of public policy as a result, and indeed no overarching public policy against these 
types of arrangements in the first place."), ajJ'd, 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). 
58 Under the QTIP provisions, the decedent receives a marital deduction in the value of the 
underlying property in a QTIP trust despite that the surviving spouse receives only an income interest in 
the trust property. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7). See Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: 
Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995), available at http://papers 
.ssm.com/so l3/papers.cfm ?abstract_ id= 12 80999: 
59 Under the QTIP provisions, the executor may elect to have a specific portion of a trust qualify 
as a QTIP trust with respect to which portion the decedent's estate receives a marital deduction. See, 
e.g., I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(iv); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(b)(I)(ii), -7(b)(ii), -7(h) (2004). The QTIP 
form of the marital deduction was and is the most popular form of the deduction. See Ira Mark Bloom, 
The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the Surviving Spouse Under the Redesigned 
Elective-Share System: Some Concerns and Suggestions, 55 ALB. L. REv. 941, 955 (1992) ("This 
scenario addresses both the multiple-marriage society phenomenon and the popularity of QTIP 
dispositions." (citation omitted)); Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach is Superior to 
Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REv. 421, 466 
(2001) ("In estates of the well-off, the most popular form of marital bequest is the QTIP trust. ... "). 
60 Inclusion of the fixed amount in the PAT in the surviving spouse's estate is required under 
§ 2041 of the Code; inclusion of the fixed amount in the QTIP, is mandated under § 2044 or earlier 
taxed as a gift under § 2519. 
61 The regulation was resuscitated by the enactment of § 2056(b)( 1 0) of the Code. 
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valuation distortion that arose solely because the courts did not consider the 
use of a defined value clause to define the amount of the marital deduction 
a significant abuse. 
In 1992, Congress enacted § 2056(b)(1O), which provided that the 
income interest or the property qualifying for the marital deduction must be 
expressed as a fractional or percentage portion and not as a fixed dollar 
amount.62 According to the conference report,63 exceptions to the tenninable 
interest rule 64 that qualify for the marital deduction require that the 
surviving spouse receive a general power of appointment over, or an 
income interest in, a "specific portion" of property that could not be 
expressed as a fixed dollar amount. Consequently, when the surviving 
spouse dies, the fractional or percentile specific portion is subject to transfer 
tax by its inclusion in her estate. "Under the court holdings [in Northeast 
Pennsylvania National Bank and Estate of Alexander], appreciation in 
certain marital deduction property may be includible in neither spouse's 
estate.,,65 The House Report explained the reasons for reversing the effect 
of those decisions: "The marital deduction postpones the imposition of the 
estate or gift tax until the property is transferred outside the marital unit. ... 
Reversal of the holdings makes the law more certain by unequivocally 
implementing the policy underlying the marital deduction.,,66 
Thus, in 1992, Congress eliminated the ability to use the freezing 
technique of a defined value amount as an allowable definition of a 
"specific portion." Because the marital deduction was enacted to defer and 
not reduce the property that would ultimately be subject to transfer tax, a 
proportional amount of appreciation between the two spouses' deaths must 
now be taxed at the surviving spouse's death or at a lifetime transfer.67 
62 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, § 1941, § 2056(b)(lO), 106 Stat. 2776, 3036 
(applicable to the estates of decedents dying after Oct. 24, 1992, the date the statute was enacted). 
63 H.R. REp. No. 102-1034 (1992) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter 1992 Conf. Rep.]; H.R. REp. No. 
102-631 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 H.R. REp.). 
64 See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(5), (6), (7)(B)(iv), 2523(e), (0 (3). 
65 1992 Conf. Rep., supra note 63, at 994 (emphasis added). 
661992 H.R. REp., supra note 63, at 264. With this change, a representative share of appreciation 
between the two spouses' deaths is includible in the surviving spouse's estate. 
67ln Estate of Turner v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 14 (2012), the court held that a pecuniary formula 
marital deduction clause could not shelter the inclusion of FLP assets in the decedent's estate, the Tax 
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II. DEFINED VALUE CLAUSES, DISCLAIMERS, AND CHARITABLE GIFTS 
The defined value clause used in Estate of Christiansen68 may not have 
resulted in distorted values because the parties agreed that the estate tax 
values were significantly higher than those stated on the decedent's estate 
tax return, and also because the court ruled that the disclaimer was not a 
qualified disclaimer. However, without the government's audit and the 
court's decision on the disclaimer (or stated alternatively, with the savings 
clause and the disclaimant's retaining her contingent remainder in the 
charitable lead trust), the court's description of the imagined government's 
scenario would have played itself out. 
Consider how these insertions of uncertainty as to the amount actually being 
donated might come into play should the estate assign an unusually low value to 
the property being disclaimed. In such a scenario, Hamilton [the disclaimant] 
would take (and the estate tax would be paid on) her $6.35 million. But the 
residue would be divided between the Foundation and the Trust. Should it tum 
out that the estate underreported that value, Hamilton's failure to disclaim her 
remainder interest in the Trust would mean that she would capture much of the 
value of that underreporting as she herself approached retirement age in 20 
years' time. And if one took an especially skeptical view of the situation, the 
final quoted phrase in the disclaimer and the savings clause meant that the 
Commissioner would face an interesting choice if he thought the estate was 
lowballing its own value-any success in increasing the value of the estate 
might only increase the charitable deduction that the estate would claim. Which 
would presumably reduce the incentive of the Commissioner to challenge the 
value that the estate claimed for itself.69 
Moreover, it will play out when the disclaimant is the decedent or donor's 
spouse instead of her daughter.7o 
The government argued in Estate of Christiansen that Procter applied 
because it was against public policy to have the government re-value the 
decedent's estate where the revaluation would merely result in an upward 
Court based its decision on the policy rationale that the marital deduction was intended to be only a 
deferral provision. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Another Turn with Turner, 136 TAX NOTES 1613 (2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=2151219. 
68 Estate of Christiansen v. Comm'r, 130 T.C. I (2008), aj]' d, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009) (The 
Tax Court opinion was court reviewed and the majority opinion, written by Judge Holmes, was joined 
by Judges Colvin, Cohen, Wells, Foley, Vasquez, Thornton, Marvel, Haines, and Goeke). 
691d. at 5-6. 
70 I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4)(A). 
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adjustment to the amount of the estate's charitable deduction,7l but the court 
rejected that contention and stated that there were several safeguards to 
prevent undervaluing the charitable donation. However, there is an issue of 
whether those purported safeguards are sufficient to prevent valuation 
distortions.72 Additionally, there is a question of whether the defined value 
clauses combined with disclaimers to charitable lead trusts really promote 
charitable "gifts" as defined under American Bar Endowment.73 
In Estate of Christiansen, the decedent had left everything she owned 
to her daughter, but she also provided that if her daughter disclaimed any 
part of the estate, the disclaimed portion would pass 75% to a testamentary 
charitable lead trust and 25% to a charitable foundation. 74 The daughter 
disclaimed all of the estate above $6.35 million. "The $6,350,000 that 
Hamilton retained was an amount she and her advisers carefully determined 
would allow the family business to continue, as well as to provide for her 
and her own family's future.,,75 That considered decision of a fixed dollar 
amount, the defined value above which any additional value passed mostly 
to a charitable lead trust benefiting the disclaimant and to a charitable 
foundation meant that at the time of the disclaimer, the decedent's daughter 
(the disclaimant) and her advisors thought "that only $40,555.80 would 
pass to the Foundation and $121,667.20 to the [charitable lead] Trust.,,76 
Before trial, the parties agreed that some of the assets in the estate 
were substantially undervalued: (1) the value of the decedent's interest in 
Christiansen Investments was $1,828,718.10, representing more than 35% 
greater than the value stated on the estate tax return; and (2) the value of her 
interest in MHC Land and Cattle was $6,751,404.63, greater than 60% of 
the value stated on the estate tax return. With those adjustments, the 
decedent's gross estate was stipulated to be $9,578,895.93 instead of 
$6,512,223.20.77 Thus, with the disclaimer relating to amounts exceeding 
71 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.e. at 16. 
72 See infra Parts IV.B. & V. 
73 United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. lOS, 117-18 (1986). 
74 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.e. at 4. 
75 [d. at 5. 
76 [d. at 6. 
77 [d. at 7. 
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$6.35 million, instead of a relatively small amount passing to charity, 78 
$2,421,671.95 passed to the charitable trust and $807,223.98 passed to the 
charitable foundation.79 
The estate asserted that the value increases entitled it to larger chari-
table deductions. 80 However, the court held that because the disclaimant 
held a contingent remainder in the charitable lead trust, no part of the 
amount that passed to the trust constituted a qualified disclaimer under the 
statute,81 regulations,82 or case law.s3 
At trial, the government conceded a charitable deduction for the 
amount claimed on the estate tax return as a donation to the foundation, but 
it refused to increase that amount to the actual value that passed to the 
charitable foundation after the revaluation of the decedent's estate.84 The 
government's denial rested on two grounds: (1) the increase was contingent 
on a condition subsequent, which was the government's challenge to the 
value of the decedent's gross estate, and (2) the requirement that the value 
of the disclaimed property would be "as such value is finally determined for 
federal estate tax purposes" is void as against public policy.85 The 
government explained that the charitable donation to the foundation was 
contingent not only because it was based on a disclaimer, but also because 
the increased donation was due to the IRS's return examination and 
challenge of the estate's valuation.86 The essence of the government's 
second argument is that the disclaimer's adjustment clause was void 
because it would discourage the IRS from examining estate tax returns.S7 
78/d. at 6. 
79/d. at 7. That meant that approximately twenty times the amount the disclaimant thought would 
pass to the foundation actually passed to that charity. 
80 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 7. 
81 I.R.C. § 25 I 8(b)(4). 
82 Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(3) (1997). 
83 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 10-12 (citing Walshire v. United States, 288 F.3d 342 (8th 
Cir. 2002)). 
84 /d. at 7. 
85/d. at 14. 
86/d. at 15. 
87/d. at 16. 
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That is, reviewing such returns would inevitably result in no additional 
revenue for the government because any deficiency would be offset by an 
additional charitable deduction in the same amount.88 
The court rejected the government's position. 89 First, the court 
explained that a qualified disclaimer meant that the transfer related back to 
the decedent's death.90 The fact that the parties disputed the estate's value 
did not mean that the transfer was contingent on a future event.91 Moreover, 
disallowance of a deduction based on public policy must be narrowly 
applied92 and the court found no public policy against increasing charitable 
gifts. 93 The court considered Procter inapplicable here, where there was 
only a reallocation among the disclaimant, the trust, and the foundation. "If 
the fair market value of the estate assets is increased for tax purposes, then 
property must actually be reallocated among the three beneficiaries. That 
would not make us opine on a moot issue, and wouldn't in any way upset 
the finality of our decision in this case.,,94 While the court acknowledged 
that the defined value clause might "marginally decrease" the government's 
inducement to audit such returns,95 the court found sufficient protection in 
the fiduciary duties of executors and state attorneys general to police 
valuation "lowballing" and to protect the charities' interests.96 
88Id. 
89 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.C. at IS. 
90 Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. at 16 (citing Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966». 
93Id. at 16-17. 
94Id.atI7. 
95 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.C. at IS. The circuit court agreed with the Tax Court that such 
might minimally detract from the government's decision to audit, but maintained that the courts had no 
obligation to interpret the statutes in a way to maximize either the government's revenue or its desire to 
audit returns. Estate a/Christiansen, 586 F.3d at 1064-65. 
96 Estate 0/ Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 17-18. The court cited to the "famed case of Hawaii's 
Bishop Estate [that] illustrates how effectively the IRS can use the threat of the loss of exempt status to 
curb breaches offiduciaty duty." Id. at 18. In addition, the court cited to the government's powers under 
§ 4958 of the Code. Likewise, the appellate court was confident that "there are countless other 
mechanisms in place to ensure that fiduciaries such as executors and administrators accurately report 
estate values." Estate a/Christiansen, 586 F.3d at 1065. See infra Part N.B. 
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Estate planners often recommend the use of a charitable lead trust to 
their wealthy clients whose self-interest, and not necessarily charitable 
intent, is paramount.97 Advocated particularly when interest rates are low, a 
charitable lead trust generally results in an inflated charitable deduction and 
the non-taxation of much of the value that passes to the non-charitable 
beneficiary at the end of the charitable term. 98 Under American Bar 
Endowment, to receive a charitable deduction for a transfer to charity, the 
taxpayer must show that he intended to make a gift.99 "The sine qua non of 
a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without 
adequate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum 
demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of 
the value of any benefit he received in retum.,,100 
Even in the transfer tax context, where the presence of donative intent 
is unnecessary to produce a taxable gift,I01 and a gift is defined as a transfer 
of property "for less than adequate and full consideration in money or 
money's worth,,,102 the regulation distinguishes transfer tax gifts from bad 
bargains in business. The purpose of the statute in omitting a requirement of 
transferor intent is to prevent property transfers from escaping the transfer 
97 See HENKEL, supra note 17, ~ 35.09; Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 
ORE. L. REv. 1133, 1135 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd 
=1268825. 
98 For example, "Dad transfers $1,000,000 in property to a CLAT with a ten year charitable term 
and an eight percent payout rate. The property earns ten percent (after-tax) yearly, and the [§) 7520 rate 
at the time of the transfer is eight percent. The remainder interest is valued at $463,192 at the time of the 
transfer. At the end of the charitable term, the value transferred to Dad's children is $1,318,748.49. Had 
Dad initially made a gift of property worth $463,192 rather than creating the CLA T, the gifted property 
would be worth $1,201,400.76 at the end often years, assuming it grew at ten percent (after-tax) each 
year." HENKEL, supra note 17, ~ 35.09. As between a CLAT and a CLUT, "[i)fthe CLT [charitable lead 
trust) property is expected to appreciate, a CLA T is usually the better choice, since the annuity remains 
fixed and more property can go to the family beneficiaries." !d. ~ 35.08. The charitable lead trust created 
in Estate a/Christiansen was a CLAT. 130 T.C. at 3. 
99 Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117. 
100 [d. at 118 (emphasis added). 
lOl See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1992) ("However, a sale, exchange, or other transfer of property 
made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free of 
any donative intent) .... "). 
102I.R.C. § 2512(b). This section of the Code defines the amount of the donor's gift as "the 
amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a 
gift .... " [d. 
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tax. The statutes conferring a deduction for transfers to a charity require a 
"gift" for the transfer to be deductible for gift and estate tax purposes. 103 
When the decedent's daughter made her disclaimer, she and her 
advisors made a studied review before determining the amount she would 
retain before stating the fixed value, $6.35 million, above which she was 
making a transfer to charity. 104 At that time, as reflected on the decedent's 
estate tax return, she intended to make a relatively small gift to the 
charitable lead trust and an even smaller gift to the charitable foundation. 105 
She had expected "that only $40,555.80 would pass to the Foundation" and 
the government at trial acceded to a charitable deduction of that amount. 106 
This fairly modest amount is also in accord with the decedent's daughter's 
statements to the IRS when she sought tax exemption for the foundation. 107 
It is difficult to believe that there was an intention to make a charitable 
donation of $807,223.98, the amount that actually passed to the charitable 
foundation after the government's audit, under the defined value clause and 
the parties' pre-trial agreement to the substantially increased value of the 
decedent's estate. lOS That is, the actual charitable transfer was twenty times 
the deduction claimed on the estate tax return after the decedent's daughter 
and her advisors carefully determined the fixed dollar amount she would 
retain. 109 
The court's stating that the IRS has great powers to deal with valuation 
distortions, such as those it uniquely applied in the Bishop's Estate case,110 
103 1.R.c. §§ 2522, 2055. 
104 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 5. 
105 Jd. at 6. 
106 Jd. 
107 
[lIn the Foundation's application to the IRS for recognition of exempt status, Hamilton 
stated: 'The initial source of funding for the foundation will be $50,000 from the Helen 
Christiansen Estate providing a 5 percent income stream annually. Additionally, there will 
be annual funding from a 7 percent charitable lead annuity trust equaling $12,500.' 
Jd. at 3. 
108/d. at 7. 
109 Jd. at 5. 
110 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 18. 
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which involved public officials in decades of fraud, mismanagement, and 
the highest levels of fiduciary malfeasance, \lI is a non-starter. However, the 
Tax Court's and the appellate court's reliance on a fiduciary's duty to 
provide accurate valuations proved inadequate to deal with pecuniary 
formula and funding marital deduction clause abuses. I 12 
III. DEFINED VALUE CLAUSES IN THE CONTEXT OF F AMIL Y LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIPS 
A. Defined Value Clauses, Family Limited Partnerships, and Charitable 
Gifts 
In McCord,113 the taxpayers, husband and wife, combined a defined 
value clause with a charitable donation and then undervalued their taxable 
transfers of FLP interests and overvalued their charitable deduction. 114 The 
III See SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, BROKEN TRUST: GREED MISMANAGEMENT & 
POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA'S LARGEST CHARITABLE TRUST (2006). 
112 See supra Part I. 
113 Succession of McCord v. Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006), rev'g 120 T.C. 358 (2003). 
Hendrix v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642, 2011 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2011-133 involved a technique 
virtually identical to McCord. Because Hendrix was appealable to the Fifth Circuit, the Tax Court was 
obliged to apply its rule in Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), ajj'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), 
which required the court to conform its opinion with that circuit's decision in McCord. ("We hold 
consistently with McCord that the formula clauses control the transfers of the JHHC stock to the trusts 
and the Foundation on December 31, 1999." Id. (citation omitted». However, there are a few points 
about Hendrix that should be noted. The court emphasized that the charity in Hendrix obtained its own 
appraisal of the value of the FLP interests; however, the foundation did not independently appraise the 
donated property, but merely had the taxpayers' appraisal approved. See Hendrix, slip op. at 10 and 19. 
Rather, in both Hendrix and McCord, it is equally questionable "why a charity would ever want to 
receive a minority limited partnership interest, but for an understanding that this interest would be 
redeemed quickly for cash, and find relevant that the interest was subject to the call provision that could 
be exercised at any time." 120 T.C. at 430 (Laro, J., joined by Vasquez, J., dissenting). In Hendrix, 
moreover, the Tax Court went further than applying Go/sen. The court rejected the government's public 
policy argument at least in part on the ground that the defined value clauses encourage charitable gifts. 
However, defined value clauses primarily promote private benefit to the donors in contravention of Am. 
Bar Endowment. 477 U.S. at 117-18. Through the use ofa charitable conduit, the taxpayers pass a 
greater value to their children without properly assessed transfer taxes. By discouraging the 
government's incentive to audit the taxpayers' returns, the defined value clauses in both McCord and 
Hendrix impede an accurate valuation of the transferors' taxable gifts to their family and their donations 
to the charities. 
114 On the date of the assignment agreement, the FLP held assets consisting of marketable 
securities (approximately 65%); real estate limited partnership interests (approximately 30%) and a mix 
of direct real estate and oil and gas interests (approximately 5%). Succession of McCord v. Comm'r, 
120 T.C. 358, 361, 367--68 (2003), rev'd, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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assignment agreement, dated January 12, 1996, defined the pecuniary value 
of the taxpayers' taxable gifts of FLP interests; anything valued above that 
fixed dollar amount passed to two charities. I 15 In addition, the assignment 
agreement both allowed the assignees to allocate their proportionate 
interests in the gifted property among themselves (which they did in March 
1996 in their confirmation agreement) 116 and included a call provision 
whereby the FLP could purchase a charity assignee's interest "at any time 
for fair market value, as determined under the partnership agreement."ll7 
The appraisal report, dated February 28, 1996, valued a 1% assignee's 
interest as of January 12, 1996 at $89,505.118 Representatives of the two 
charities reviewed the report and decided it was unnecessary to seek an 
additional appraisal of their own, agreed not to contest the confirmation 
agreement allocations, and waived their right to arbitration.1l9 On June 26, 
1996, the FLP exercised its call right to purchase the charities' assignee 
interests at the appraiser's updated value of $93,540 for a 1% "assignee's 
interest in the Class B Limited Partnership Interests" as of June 25, 1996.120 
Again, the charities voiced no objections and received $338,967 (CFT) and 
$140,041 (the Symphony) for their interests. 121 
115 [d. at 358, 364--65. "Under the terms of a 'formula clause' contained in the assignment 
agreement (the formula clause), the children and the trusts were to receive portions of the gifted interest 
having an aggregate fair market value of $6,910,933; if the fair market value of the gifted interest 
exceeded $6,910,933, then the symphony was to receive a portion of the gifted interest having a fair 
market value equal to such excess, up to $134,000; and, if any portion of the gifted interest remained 
after the allocations to the children, trusts, and symphony, then CFT was to receive that portion (i.e., the 
portion representing any residual value in excess of$7,044,933)." [d. at 364. The taxpayers' sons agreed 
to pay transfer taxes resulting from either or both of their parents' deaths within three years of the gift. 
This article will not address the issue of discounting the value of a gift for what is known as "tax 
affecting," except to mention here that the Tax Court refused apply this discount and the Fifth Circuit 
reversed and allowed the taxpayers this valuation discount. 
116 !d. at 365. 
117 [d. at 363. 
118 [d. at 366. 
119[d. 
120 McCord, 120 T.C. at 366. 
121 [d. at 365--{i6. 
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In its notice of deficiency, the government stated that Mr. and 
Mrs. McCord undervalued their gifts, causing gift tax deficiencies. 122 At 
trial, the government argued that the taxpayers' undervaluation was 
achieved "by mischaracterizing the assignment and applying excessive 
discounts.,,123 Furthermore, the court maintained that the formula clause, 
intended to thwart any increase in the value of the gift, was void. 124 
The Tax Court held that the formula clause in the assignment 
agreement was "not self-effectuating" and left "to the assignees the task of 
(1) determining the fair market value of the gifted interest and (2) plugging 
that value into the formula clause to determine the fraction of the gifted 
interest passing to CFT.,,125 According to the court, the formula supplied in 
the assignment agreement provided the computation to determine the 
fractional interests of the gifts to CFT, the Symphony, the sons, and the 
generation skipping transfer tax (GSTT) trusts. If any of the assignees 
disputed their respective interest, there was a provision in the partnership 
agreement detailing the appointment of an arbitrator and the binding 
122Id. at 367; see also McCord, 461 FJd at 621. The estate's deficiencies were based on 
increasing the value of each taxpayer's gifts, respectively by $3,740,904 and $3,730,439. Jd. The 
government's notice also stated that the taxpayers had "improperly reduced such gross value by the 
actuarial value of the children's obligation to pay additional estate taxes potentially attributable to the 
transaction." !d. As earlier stated, this article will not address the issue of tax affecting the gifts. See 
supra note 115. 
123 McCord, 120 T.C. at 369. According to the Tax Court, the parties' differing valuations were at 
least partially due to their different interpretation of the extent of the assignee rights the taxpayers 
transferred, that is whether or not the taxpayers could and did admit the donees as class B limited 
partners. Under Texas law, the court explained that the assignees were not class B partners, which fact 
diminishes the value of their interests. Id. at 369-70. The court concluded that the taxpayers assigned 
only economic rights in the FLP. Id. at 370-73. The parties agreed that the FLP's net asset value (NAV) 
was $17,673,760 on January 12,1996. Id. at 375. The court then reduced that value by $20,000 because 
the partnership agreement gave the class A limited partner a $20,000 priority claim against the FLP's 
assets. [d. at 376. In so doing, the court agreed with the estate's expert. Id. The court calculated both a 
minority interest discount of 15% (id. at 387) and a lack of marketability discount of 20%. [d. at 387, 
395. After applying those discounts, the court concluded that the value of each taxpayer's gift was 
$4,941,916. Id. at 395. The taxpayers contended that since the total value of their gifts ($9,883,832) 
exceeded $7,044,933, the excess ($2,838,899) above their defined value gift was a charitable 
contribution to CFT. Id. at 395-96. The court rejected that analysis. "Because the assignment agreement 
does not equate the term 'fair market value' with the term 'fair market value as finally determined for 
Federal gift tax purposes,' petitioners' argument must fail." [d. at 396. 
124 McCord, 120 T.C. at 369. At trial, the government bore the burden of proof. !d. The 
government's "value of a one-percent interest in MIL was $171,749, almost double the Taxpayers' one-
percent figure of $89,505." McCord, 461 F.3d at 621. 
125 [d. at 396. 
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arbitration procedure that would be used to detennine value. 126 That is, "the 
assignment agreement contemplates the allocation of the gifted interest 
based on the assignees' best estimation ofthat value.,,127 
While binding among the assignees regarding their respective interests, 
the court found that the value of a 1 % FLP assignee interest on January 12, 
1996 was $120,046. Thus, the non-charitable gifts constituted a 
77.21280956% assignee interest valued at $9,269,089; the Symphony's 
1.49712307% assignee interest was valued at $179,724; and CFT's 
3.62376573% assignee interest was valued at $435,019. 128 These amounts 
add up to the total transferred value, $9,883,832 ($4,941,916 for each 
taxpayer). Applying annual exclusions, the court held that the taxpayers 
were entitled to charitable deductions of$415,019 ($207,510 for each) for 
their donations to CFT.129 
Reversing the Tax Court's decision, the Fifth Circuit detennined that 
the taxpayers had properly valued their gifts to family at a total value of 
$6,910,932.52 and were entitled to charitable donations of $458,277.16.130 
Thus, according to the appellate court, under the assignment agreement 
dated January 12, 1996, the taxpayers had transferred interests valued at 
$2,475,896.40 and $2,482,604.82, which, after annual exclusions and 
charitable deductions, amounted to total taxable gifts of $4,420,156 
($2,206,724 to their sons and $2,213,432 to the GSTT trusts).l3l 
The taxpayers had contributed an equal amount of assets totaling 
$12,294,384 for their combined 82.33369836% Class B limited partnership 
interest. 132 On January 12, 1996, through their assignment agreement 
enabling them to make concurrent taxable gifts to their family members and 
126Id. at 396-97. 
127Id. at 397. 
128/d. at 398. 
129/d. at 404. 
130 Succession of McCord v. Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 2006), rev'g 120 T.C. 358 
(2003). The court also held that the taxpayers were entitled to multiple discounts including a discount 
for their donee's obligation to pay any estate taxes due under § 2035 for gifts made within three years of 
a donor's death. Id. 
131Id. at 621 n. 13,632. 
132/d. at 616. 
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gifts to the exempt donees, the taxpayers irrevocably relinquished all of 
their Class B FLP interests. 133 The court held that this transfer was made 
"according to a sequentially structured 'defined value clause' and not, as 
the Tax Court had held, in percentage interests, in accordance with the 
donees' confirmation agreement executed in March 1996.,,134 
According to the Fifth Circuit, the Tax Court's decision was not based 
on any of the government's arguments, but on its own theory, which "gave 
controlling effect to the post-gift Confirmation Agreement.,,135 The appel-
late court held "that the Majority's unique methodology violated the 
immutable maxim that post-gift occurrences do not affect, and may not be 
considered in, the appraisal and valuation processes.,,136 The circuit court 
cited Ithaca Trust l37 as holding that a court may not rely on post-gift events 
to value a gift. 138 In McCord, the circuit court refused to look at any 
transaction that occurred after the date of the gift, regardless how probable 
and foreseeable under the assignment agreement. 139 Unlike the Tax Court 
1331d. at 618. 
1341d. For the March agreement, each donee, including CFT, retained an independent attorney 
and, although CFT did not seek its own appraisal, there was no finding of collusion or a tacit 
understanding to blindly accept the taxpayers' figures. Near the end of June 1996, the FLP exercised its 
call right to redeem the charities' interests. In connection with that event, the FLP sought an updated 
appraisal, which the charities reviewed and accepted. Id. at 619-20. 
135 McCord, 461 F.3d at 622 ("Stated differently, the Majority in essence suspended the valuation 
date of the property that the Taxpayers donated in January until the date in March on which the disparate 
donees acted, post hoc, to agree among themselves on the Class B limited partnership percentages that 
each would accept as equivalents of the dollar values irrevocably and unconditionally given by the 
Taxpayers months earlier."). 
1361d. 
137 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). The court also cited its own precedent 
on this issue: Estate of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d SIS (5th Cir. 1999), rev'g, vacating, and remanding 
108 T.C. 412 (1997). 
138 McCord, 461 F.3d at 626 ("The core flaw in the Majority's inventive methodology was its 
violation of the long-prohibited practice of relying on post-gift events."). 
1391d. at 628. 
The assigrunent agreement leaves to the assignees the task of allocating the gifted 
interest among themselves; in other words, in accordance with the formula clause, the 
assignees were to allocate among themselves the approximately 82-percent partnership 
interest assigned to them by petitioners. . .. In March 1996, the assignees executed a 
Confirmation Agreement (the confirmation agreement) allocating the gifted interest among 
themselves. 
McCord, 120 T.C. at 365. 
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that valued proportionate interests (as defined by the donees in the 
confinnation agreement as anticipated in the taxpayers' assignment 
agreement),t40 the appellate court sanctioned all of the taxpayers' valuation: 
both their use of a defined value clause and their valuation of a 1 % FLP 
interest. 141 
While the value of a gift is what the donor transferred and not what the 
donee received, in this instance, because the assignment and confirmation 
agreements were integrally connected, there is a question about what 
property the taxpayers transferred: a fixed dollar amount or a percentage 
interest. The appellate court never addressed the government's integrated 
transaction argument though, implicitly, it was at the core of the Tax 
Court's opinion. 142 The court remarked that the government's value was 
twice that of the taxpayers' but did not consider that discrepancy 
significant. Yet, there was no explanation for such a marked valuation 
difference occurring between January and March 1996. 143 
140 McCord, 120 T.C. at 365-66. "Specifically, the Majority used the after-the-fact Confirmation 
Agreement to mutate the Assignment Agreement's dollar value gifts into percentage interests in MIL." 
McCord, 461 F.3d at 626. 
141 According to the appellate court: 
The complex appellate review required in this gift tax case implicates (I) the 
interpretation and effect of contractual agreements, (2) the nature of property interests 
transferred by gift, (3) determination of the fair market value of such interests, and 
(4) special law rules governing that kind of evaluation exercise, including the types and 
percentages of discounts that may be applied. Thus, our standard of review here cannot be 
covered adequately by rotely reciting the ubiquitous single-sentence mantra that 'we 
review factual determinations for clear error and legal determinations de novo.' The 
particularized standard of review applicable in this case is accurately stated in the 
Taxpayers' appellate brief: 'An appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law 
de novo and draws its own conclusions in place of those of the trial court.' 
McCord, 461 F.3d at 622-23. The court ignored the estate's significant overvaluation of a 1% MIL 
interest. Jd. at 621 ("The Commissioner's fair market value of a one-percent interest in MIL was 
$171,749, almost double the Taxpayers' one-percent figure of $89,505."). The appellate court should 
have been struck by the great distortion in value between the fixed defined value gift and the values 
under the confirmation agreement; however, it appears that the appellate court's only analysis and 
criticism of the Tax Court's analysis of value was that "the Majority split this almost $10 million baby 
precisely halfway between the experts' respective values." See id. at 625 n.23. 
142 See McCord, 120 T.C. at 398 n.47; see also infra note 172. 
143 That striking difference should have triggered a "sanity check." See, e.g., Pollack v. Comm'r, 
366 F.3d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[S)ubsequent events that shed light on what a willing buyer would 
have paid on the date in question are admissible, such as 'evidence of actual sales prices received for 
property after the date [in question), so long as the sale occurred within a reasonable time ... and no 
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Likewise, the appellate court ignored the anticipated redemption by the 
FLP of the charities' FLP's interests and disregarded questions about the 
deductibility of that transfer. The charities did not hire their own valuation 
experts or conduct themselves like unrelated third parties. l44 Because the 
charities knew about the call right granted under the assignment agreement, 
they likely accepted the unmarketable FLP interests because they knew they 
would soon receive cash for them. 145 "Suffice it to say that, in the long run, 
it is against the economic interest of a charitable organization to look a gift 
horse in the mouth.,,146 
It is also dubious whether the taxpayers had the requisite charitable 
intent under American Bar Endowment. When a donation is defined as 
transferring an unknown excess value over a fixed amount, the 
indefiniteness of the value transferred undermines any purpose147 to make a 
charitable transfer, as there may in fact be no transfer to a charity under a 
defined value clause. Whatever public policy there is in favor of charities, 
there is no public policy to encourage transfers to charities unless those 
transfers are donations, characterized by the donor's intent to contribute 
money or property in excess of the personal benefit received. The taxpayers 
in these cases undervalue their non-charitable transfers, discourage a 
government audit, and, if they are audited, accede to whatever gift to 
intervening events drastically changed the value of the property." (citing First Nat'l Bank of Kenosha v. 
United States, 763 F.2d 891,894 (7th Cir. 1985)); Okerlund v. United States, 365 F.3d 1044,1053 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) ("The greater the significance of exogenous or unforeseen events occurring between the 
valuation date and the date of the proffered evidence, the less likely ex post evidence is to be relevant-
even as a sanity check on the assumptions underlying a valuation model."); Gross v. Comm'r, 272 F.3d 
333, 341-42 (6th Cir. 2001) (The appellate court held that although 79 of the 157 transactions were 
post-valuation-date, they could be considered to determine the value of the gifted stock because they 
could have been anticipated); Saltzman v. Comm'r, I31 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[S)ubsequent 
events are not considered in fixing fair market value except to the extent that they were reasonably 
foreseeable on the date of the gift.") (emphasis added). 
144 See McCord, 120 T.C. at 430 (Laro, J., dissenting) ("[llhe charities never obtained a separate 
and independent appraisal of their interests (including whether the call price was actually the fair market 
value of those interests), ... the charities agreed to waive their arbitration rights as to the allocation of 
the partnership interests .... "). 
145Id. ("[W)hy a charity would ever want to receive a minority limited partnership interest, but 
for an understanding that this interest would be redeemed quickly for cash, and find relevant that the 
interest was subject to the call provision that could be exercised at any time."). 
146 Id. at 373 n.9. 
147 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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charity is necessary in order to avoid transfer tax on their taxable family 
gifts. Because the "gifts" of non-marketable FLP interests to a charity are 
not objectively valued by the charity, and because the interests are 
redeemed by the non-exempt donees shortly thereafter for cash (a good 
reason for the charities not to complain and motive for their compliance in 
all the taxpayers' plans), moreover, the taxpayers have received an inflated 
charitable deduction for their unintentional charitable gift.148 
Consider a decedent who left a fixed amount of her estate to her child 
and the (currently unknown) remainder of her estate to the American 
Cancer Society (ACS). If the decedent would not know the exact amount 
that would be going to the ACS, would that mean her gift is without 
charitable intent? That, of course, depends on the facts. If the fixed amount 
was $20 million and the decedent had never had more than $10 million, the 
decedent likely did not have the requisite intent. 149 That is, the purported 
charitable transfer would be illusory or too speculative. If the fixed amount 
were $1 million and the decedent had more than $20 million at all times, 
the decedent likely would have a purposeful charitable intention. In the 
typical FLP context where there is a transfer of any excess to charity if the 
taxable transfer triggers a tax liability, the formula clause has the primary 
purpose of ensuring that the taxpayer pays no tax; there is clearly no 
understanding that there will be any charitable gift because that transfer is 
conditioned on the taxpayer's having been audited and found to have 
increased his tax liability. It is as if the decedent said, "I don't want to pay 
any taxes, but if it looks as if I'll have to do that, I would rather the money 
go to a charity instead of the government!" Because the IRS has a 
disincentive to audit a return that cannot produce additional taxable 
revenue, the taxpayer is more likely to avoid an audit; in that case, the 
taxpayer's likely undervalued transfer to family members will escape 
taxation. With that aim in mind, and under those facts, it is likewise 
improbable that the taxpayer had a purposeful charitable intent outweighing 
more personal monetary motives. 
Similarly, in Estate of Petter, the taxpayer made a part-gift, part-sale 
transfer of family LLC units to two trusts and a charitable donation of the 
148 See McCord, 120 T.e. at 427-29 (Laro, 1., dissenting). 
149 Of course, nothing would pass to the charity unless on the day he died he won the $20+ 
million lotteI)'. 
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units to two charitable foundations. The transfer documents included both a 
defined value clause and a reallocation clause. 150 The reallocation clause 
required gift transfers from the trust to the foundations if the value of the 
units, as finally determined for gift tax purposes, exceeded a fixed dollar 
amount. 151 Not surprisingly, after her audit, the donor's units were deemed 
to have a higher value for each unit; consequently, the reallocation clause 
required that the foundations receive additional units. 152 The taxpayer 
contended that she was entitled to an additional charitable donation equal to 
the increased units given to the foundations and both the Tax Court and the 
Ninth Circuit agreed.153 
Not wanting to pay any gift tax, the taxpayer gave the trusts units 
equal to her unused unified credit ($1 million) plus her available annual 
exclusions (in 2002, that amount was $11,000 per donee ).154 Then, taking 
back a 20-year note bearing 5.37% interest and requiring quarterly 
payments of $83,476.30, she sold additional units to the trusts. 155 According 
to the taxpayer's estate planner, those transfers created a charitable freeze 
under which, if the government challenged the gift valuation, an excess 
would not result in additional gift tax but in additional charitable 
donations.156 
The IRS audit determined that each unit had a greater value than the 
taxpayer reported so that, according to the government, the taxpayer's gifts 
exceeded her unified credit and the sales were not for adequate 
consideration in money or money's worth. 157 The government further 
declared that the defined value clauses were void as against public policy 
and, citing a regulation,158 refused the additional charitable deductions on 
150 Estate of Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 536---37, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-280, ajJ'd, 653 F.3d 
1012 (9th Cir. 2011). 
151Id. at 537. 
152Id. at 539. 
153Id. at 545. See also Estate of Petter, 653 FJd at 1023. 
154 Estate of Petter, 653 F.3d at 1015. 
155Id. 
156Id. at 1015 n.2. 
157Id. at 1017. 
158 Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1). 
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the basis that the transfer resulted from a "post-audit reallocation of units 
between the foundation and the trustS.,,159 
While the government argued that the foundations' right to the 
additional units adhered only after a successful IRS audit, the court held 
that the transfers were immediately effective when the transfer documents 
were executed and the units delivered.160 Only the value of the units 
remained unsettled. According to the court, when the transfer was created, 
mathematical calculations could determine the number of units the 
foundations would receive. Those computations merely awaited a 
determination of fair market value. 161 The court acknowledged the practical 
unlikelihood of a valuation challenge by the trusts or the foundations, and 
that therefore, in reality, an IRS audit was required for such a challenge; 
however, the court stated that this fact did not transform the foundations' 
rights into contingent ones.162 
At the same time, while the foundations (the donees) may have had a 
right to the additional units, the taxpayer could not have had the requisite 
intent to make a charitable gift when the transfer occurred. At that point, the 
taxpayer was most concerned that her transfer be one exempt from tax by 
means of her annual exclusions and her unused unified credit amount. It 
was only if the low valuation of an LLC unit was brought to light in an 
audit that the taxpayer's fallback, second choice intention, was to shelter 
the additional transfers from tax by transforming them into charitable 
donations. 
The appellate court stated that "[b ]ecause the fair market value of an 
LLC unit on a particular date is a constant, the foundations received gifts of 
a determinable amount.,,163 While the value of a unit may well have been 
constant, the number of units constituting a fixed value was unknown and 
whether or to what extent any unit might pass to a charity was likewise 
unknown. Because she did not know whether there would be any charitable 
gift, and because the taxpayer's primary motive in using a defined value 
159 Estate a/Petter, 653 F.3d at 1018. 
160 [d. 
161 [d. at 1018-19. 
162 [d. at 1019. 
163 [d. at 1023. 
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clause was likely to transfer more value untaxed to her family, the taxpayer 
probably lacked the requisite intent to make a gift to charity and receive a 
charitable donation deduction. 
B. Defined Value Clauses and Family Limited Partnerships (Without the 
Charitable Gift) 
In Wandry, the Tax Court held that the taxpayers' gifts to their 
children and grandchildren were gifts of fixed dollar amounts equal to 
comparable amounts of family limited liability company share units and 
that the defined value clause in their transfer documents was not void as 
contrary to public policy.l64 In 2004, the taxpayers each purportedly made 
gifts to their children and grandchildren totaling the nine beneficiaries' 
annual exclusions, plus, to the four children, a quarter of a million dollars 
each, representing each donor's lifetime gift tax exclusion.165 The taxpayers 
intended to make taxable gifts that fell within the exempted amounts. 
The gift document stated that "[a]1though the number of Units gifted is 
fixed on the date of the gift, that number is based on the fair market value 
of the gifted Units, which cannot be known on the date of the gift but must 
be determined after such date based on all relevant information as of that 
date.,,166 Further, the instrument recited the donors' intention to have an 
independent appraiser value the number of units, with a proviso that if the 
IRS challenged the number, it would be adjusted as necessary "in the same 
manner as a federal estate tax formula marital deduction amount would be 
adjusted for a valuation redetermination by the IRS and/or a court of 
law.,,167 The taxpayers' attorney explained that if there were a revaluation, 
no units would be returned to them; rather, there would be a reallocation of 
their capital accounts to reflect the actual gifts (thus, a retained interest).168 
On July 26,2005, the appraiser valued a 1% LLC interest at $109,000.169 
164 Wandry v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472,2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2012-88. 
165 !d. at 1473. 
166Id. at 1473-74. 
167Id. at 1474. 
168 In 2004, the taxpayers' capital accounts decreased in the aggregate by $3,603,311, increasing 
their children's and grandchildren's capital accounts by approximately $855,745 and $36,066, 
respectively.ld. at 1474. Each taxpayer's gift tax return for 2004 indicated the total fixed value of his 
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Applying the Ninth Circuit's three-part test in Estate of Petter to the 
facts in Wandry, the Tax Court determined that under the gift document, the 
donees were at all times entitled to receive predefined LLC percentage 
units, expressed in a mathematical formula, and the value of an LLC unit, 
although unknown when the gift documents were executed, was a constant. 
Each child was entitled to receive approximately a 1.98% interest and each 
grandchild approximately a 0.083% interest. 170 Without the audit, the 
donees might not have received their proper LLC percentage interest, "but 
that does not mean that parts of petitioners' transfers were dependent upon 
an IRS audit.,,171 
The court stated that it was unimportant that the adjustment clause 
reallocated the units between the parties instead of transferring excess 
valued units to a charity "because the reallocations [did] not alter the 
transfers. On January 1, 2004, each donee was entitled to a predefined 
Norseman percentage interest expressed through a formula.,,172 According 
to the Tax Court, the gift documents did not cause the taxpayers' gifts to be 
revocable, but merely provided a method to correct the allocation of units 
because the appraisal undervalued the units. The court held that there was 
no public policy against formula clauses and that there were mechanisms 
apart from an IRS audit, such as competing interests of the LLC members, 
to ensure accurate valuation. I73 
However, the defined value clause in Wandry presents a scenario in 
which the taxpayer used a defined value provision as a way of nullifying his 
gifts, but described the gifts as 2.39% and 0.101% LLC interests, respectively, based on the appraiser's 
figure. Id. Both the taxpayers and the government agreed that as of January I, 2004, those percentage 
interests were worth $315,800 and $13,346, respectively. /d. The court declined to adopt the 
government's view that the LLC's capital accounts controlled the nature of the taxpayers' gifts. The 
court stated that "[t]he facts and circumstances determine Norseman's capital accounts, not the other 
way around." Id. at 1476. Moreover, the court found the capital account ledger "unofficial and 
unreliable." Id. 
1691d. at 1474. 
I7OId. at 1477-78. 
1711d. at 1478. 
172 Id. That there is no charitable donation in Wandry "does not result in a 'severe and immediate' 
public policy concern." Id. at 1479. 
173/d. at 1478 ("Each member of Norseman has an interest in ensuring that he or she is allocated 
a fair share of profits and not allocated any excess losses."). See infra Part lV.B. 
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transfer. That is, the effect of the defined value clause in the FLP context is 
a type of retained control, which cancels the purported transfer because the 
provision allows the donor to alter the identity of the donee or donees. As 
such, the case parallels Procter, which is explained in more detail in the 
next part of this article. 
IV. REJECTED, IGNORED, AND INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS 
A. Procter and Robinette 
In Estate of Christiansen, McCord, Estate of Petter, and Wandry, 174 
the government argued that Procter applied and that the defined value 
clauses were void as contrary to public policy. In each of those cases, the 
courts either did not address this issue 175 or, most often, rejected the 
174 See Hendrix v. Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642,2011 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2011-133, a case 
almost identical to McCord. 
175 See, e.g., Succession of McCord v. Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614, 623 (5th Cir. 2006) ("At the outset, 
we reiterate that, although the Commissioner relied on several theories before the Tax Court, including 
doctrines of form-over-substance, violation-of-public policy, and, possibly, reasonable-probability-of-
receipt, he has not advanced any of those theories on appeal. Accordingly, the Commissioner has 
waived them."), rev'g 120 T.C. 358 (2003). The majority opinion in the Tax Court did not address any 
of these theories, but the dissent did. See Succession of McCord v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 358, 425-30 
(Laro, J., dissenting). Besides the application ofComm'r v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1994) and 
Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986), Judge Laro also addressed the government's integrated transaction 
argument and concluded that the taxpayer's actions were parts of an integrated transaction. He based 
that conclusion on the following: 
(I) Petitioners were seeking expert advice on the transfer of their wealth with minimal tax 
consequences, (2) the transaction contemplated that the charities would be out of the 
picture shortly after the gift was made, (3) the transfers of the partnership interests to the 
charities were subject to a call provision that could be exercised at any time, (4) the call 
provisions were exercised almost contemporaneously with the transfers to the charities, 
(5) the call price was significantly below fair market value, (6) the charities never obtained 
a separate and independent appraisal of their interests (including whether the call price was 
actually the fair market value of those interests), (7) neither charity ever had any 
managerial control over the partnership, (8) the charities agreed to waive their arbitration 
rights as to the allocation of the partnership interests, and (9) petitioners' sons were at all 
times in control of the transaction. I also query as to this case why a charity would ever 
want to receive a minority limited partnership interest, but for an understanding that this 
interest would be redeemed quickly for cash, and find relevant that the interest was subject 
to the call provision that could be exercised at any time. 
McCord, 120 T.C. at 429-30. Like in McCord, in its appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Estate of Petter v. 
Comm 'r, the government abandoned its Procter argument. 653 F.3d at 1023 n.7. 
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government's position.176 In Procter, a trust provided that a gift would 
revert to the donor if it were later detennined that this gift would be subject 
to gift tax. The court held that the trust provision was void as contrary to 
public policy because it (1) discourages the government's tax collection by 
making futile the audit of returns; (2) renders the court's decision moot by 
negating the gift the court has examined; and (3) disturbs a final 
judgment. 177 
The taxpayer in Procter asserted that the Tax Court's decision in his 
favor should be affinned because, under the tenns of the trust, the gift was 
not to become effective if it were found to be subject to a gift tax. The 
circuit court, however, rejected the taxpayer's contention, and held that 
inserting such a clause in the trust could not prevent the imposition of the 
gift tax. The court explained that the reason that the court said the clause 
would likely discourage the government's tax collection was because "the 
only effect of an attempt to enforce the tax would be to defeat the gift,,178 
and that it did not accept that the gift tax could be eluded by that means. 
The court further explained that if a court decided a donor had made a 
taxable gift, "the court making such decision must hold it not a gift and 
therefore not subject to tax" and that that incongruous result would create 
the "sort of trifling with the judicial process [that] cannot be sustained.,,179 
The courts have read Procter narrowly; they reject the application of 
Procter, stating that Procter requires that a clause constitute a "condition 
subsequent,,180 and that it must "undo the gift.,,181 However, Procter should 
176 See, e.g., Estate of Christiansen, 130 T.C. I, 17 (2008) ("This case is not Procter."), affd, 586 
F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009); Hendrix, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1647, 20ll T.C.M. (RIA) 1 20ll-133 ("The 
present case is distinguishable from Procter and its progeny. Here, unlike there, the formula clauses 
impose no condition subsequent that would defeat the transfer."); Estate of Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 
542,2009 T.C.M. (RIA) 12009-280, affd, 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The Christiansen formula 
was sufficiently different from the Procter formula that we held it did not raise the same policy 
problems. A shorthand for this distinction is that savings clauses are void, but formula clauses are 
fine."); Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) 12012-88 (There is no charitable 
donation for amounts in excess of the fixed value amount in the defined value clause at issue in Wandry. 
That fact "does not result in a 'severe and immediate' public policy concern." Jd. at 1478-79.). 
177 Procter, 142 F.2d at 827. 
178 Jd. 
179 Jd. 
180 See, e.g., Estate of Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 540-41, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2009-280 ("The 
Fourth Circuit's opinion rested on two propositions that now frequently appear in gift and estate tax 
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be read more broadly to include other, similar forms of "trifling with the 
judicial process." 
In Procter, the taxpayer purported to have made a gift of a certain 
value. When audited, the taxpayer tried to nullify the gift because it was 
found to be taxable. The taxpayer tried to do that through the application of 
a trust provision. At trial, because the court agreed with the government that 
the transfer was a taxable one, the court then had to decide whether to void 
the provision on public policy grounds. In the defined value clause cases in 
the FLP context, the taxpayer claimed to make a gift of a certain value. 
When audited, the taxpayer attempted to change the donee for the part of 
that claimed gift through the application of a defined value provision. The 
gift tax is imposed on the donor's transfer of control of the property. What 
constitutes a completed transfer is defined in the regulations. 182 If the 
taxpayer retains the ability to change the identity of the donee, he has made 
an incomplete gift.183 At trial, because the court agreed with the government 
that the transfer would have been a taxable one as purported by the taxpayer 
on his gift tax return and because the provision allowed an alteration of 
donee to nullify part of a purported taxable gift, the court then had to decide 
whether to void the provision on public policy grounds. This situation 
differs from typical cases where the taxpayer had undervalued his gift. The 
usual result when a court has found that the taxpayer has made a taxable 
gift or one with a higher value is one where the taxpayer has increased his 
gift tax liability. If a deduction or additional exemption applied to exempt 
the gift, it would have applied initially, as the taxpayer described the gift in 
his return. The effect of the defined value clause in the FLP context is a 
type of retained control, which could nullify part of the claimed transfer. 
This issue requires the application of Procter. 
cases involving adjustment clauses. The first is that the gift was a 'present gift of a future interest in 
property' and that the fonnula therefore created a condition subsequent."). 
181 See, e.g., Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1478, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2012-88; Estate of 
Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 17 (distinguishing Procter: "The contested phrase would not undo a transfer, 
but only reallocate the value of the property transferred among Hamilton, the Trust, and the 
Foundation .... That would not make us opine on a moot issue, and wouldn't in any way upset the 
finality of our decision in this case. "). 
182 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1999). 
183 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (as amended in 1999). 
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A policy reason the government has advanced in these cases is that the 
defined value clauses provide an impetus for undervaluing property 
interests. 184 While Tellier, 185 in the income tax context, holds that 
deductions should not be denied unless there is a clear public policy against 
allowing the particular deduction, valuation distortion in the area of transfer 
taxation is an abuse equivalent to undermining the tax itself. The taxpayer 
creates valuation complexities and then undervalues his gifts by using a 
defined value clause. The government has two choices: it can either ignore 
the abuse, undercutting the tax, or it can challenge the taxpayer's valuation, 
spending the government's money litigating that value without any 
possibility of recovering any of the tax. 186 Most of the courts acknowledge 
that a defined value clause is a disincentive for the government to audit a 
return although most considered the deterrent "marginal.,,187 However, the 
expectation or hope in employing a defined valuation clause in this context 
is that the government will stop enforcing the law. Is that not a conundrum 
similar to that in Procter? 
In Wandry, rejecting the application of Procter, the Tax Court stated 
that, without the audit, the donees might not have received their proper LLC 
percentage interest, "but that does not mean that parts of petitioners' 
transfers were dependent upon an IRS audit.,,188 As a practical matter, it 
means just that: parts of the taxpayers' gifts would go to another party 
instead of being retained by the donors and includible in their estates. If the 
defined value clause inhibits a government audit, the taxpayer's transfer of 
184 Estate of Christiansen, 586 F.3d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 2009) ("The Commissioner argues that a 
policy supporting audits as a means to enforce accurate reporting requirements mandates that we 
disallow fixed-dollar-amount partial disclaimers because of the potential moral hazard or untoward 
incentive they create for executors and administrators to undervalue estates."), ajJ'g 130 T.C. I (2008). 
185 Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
186 As Judge Laro indicated, like in Procter, "the possibility of an increased charitable deduction 
serves to discourage respondent from collecting tax on the transaction because any attempt to enforce 
the tax due on the transaction is of no advantage to the fisc." McCord, 120 T.C. at 429 (Laro, J., 
dissenting). 
187 Estate of Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 17. See also Estate of Christiansen, 586 F.3d at 1064 
("[W]e agree with the Commissioner that the Tax Court's ruling in this case may marginally detract 
from the incentive to audit estate returns. It is possible that in some hypothetical case involving a fixed-
dollar-amount partial disclaimer, a post-challenge correction to an estate's value could result in a 
charitable deduction equal to the increase in the estate, resulting in no increased estate tax."). 
188 Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1478,2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2012-88. 
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value to family members is dependent on the government not auditing those 
returns. Thus, by allowing the transferor to retain the ability to choose the 
identity of the donee in order to avoid a taxable transfer through a defined 
value clause, at least part of the transfer is dependent on a government 
audit. 
The Eighth Circuit in Christiansen stated: "[W]e disagree with the 
Commissioner's argument that we must interpret the statute and regulations 
in an effort to maximize the incentive to audit.... Rather, the 
Commissioner's role is to enforce the tax laws.,,189 However, it is not the 
court's role either to maximize or minimize the government's incentive to 
audit taxpayers' returns. Because defined value clauses in the context of 
FLPs promote tax evasion, the courts should find that there is a strong 
public policy reason to invalidate them. 
While the second and third Procter policy rationales of mooting a 
court's decision and disturbing a court's judgment are not literally 
applicable to the use of a defined value clause in the context of the transfer 
of an FLP interest, they are indeed essentially violated. 
Furthennore, a condition that causes a part of a gift to lapse if it is detennined 
for Federal gift tax purposes that the value of the gift exceeds a given amount, so 
as to avoid a gift tax deficiency, involves the same sort of "trifling with the 
judicial process" condemned in Procter. If valid, such condition would compel 
us to issue, in effect, a declaratory judgment as to the [property's] value, while 
rendering the case moot as a consequence. Yet, there is no assurance that the 
[donors] will actually reclaim a portion of the [property] previously conveyed to 
[the donees], and our decision on the question of valuation in a gift tax suit is not 
binding upon [the donees], who are not parties to this action. 190 
In Ward, the court accepted that the gift might not be legally negated or 
undone. However, the court considered the upshot fundamentally identical 
to Procter. If a court finds an excess value over the defined value, the court 
has been obliged to "issue, in effect, a declaratory judgment as to the 
[property's] value, while rendering the case moot as a consequence.,,191 
189 Estate of Christiansen, 586 F.3d at 1064. 
190 Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78,114 (\986), cited in Succession of McCord v. Comm'r, 120 
T.C. 358,429 (Laro, J., dissenting), rev'd, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006). 
191 In Estate of Petter, the Tax Court draw a distinction "between a donor who gives away a fixed 
set of rights with uncertain value-that's Christiansen-and a donor who tries to take property back-
that's Procter." 98 T.C.M. at 542, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-280. Ward, however, minimizes that 
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Besides Procter the government and the courts have not applied 
Robinette in their discussion of public policy; however, the holding in 
Robinette underscores the government's position. Before the taxpayer in 
Robinette married, she, her mother, and her stepfather sought an estate 
planning attorney's advice. All three created trusts with successive life 
estates, with the remainder to pass to their daughter's issue at age twenty-
one and with alternative dispositions if at the last surviving life tenant there 
were no issue. 192 The taxpayer contended that in computing the value of the 
remainder for gift tax purposes, she should be allowed to subtract the value 
of her reversionary interest. However, the government maintained that a 
reduction in the value of the remainder interest was inappropriate because 
the value of the reversionary interest could not be ascertained through the 
actuarial tables. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the government because the grantor's 
reversionary interest was not only dependent on survivorship, but also on 
her death without issue attaining twenty-one years. There is no actuarial 
method to determine the value of her interest. "But before one who gives 
this property away by this method is entitled to deduction from his gift tax 
on the basis that he had retained some of these complex strands it is 
necessary that he at least establish the possibility of approximating what 
value he holds.,,193 
A taxpayer who holds liquid assets, like cash and marketable 
securities, and who could have transferred her stock outright, but realized 
that doing so would have enabled the IRS to tax its full value, and thereafter 
transfers those assets to an FLP or family LLC and creates a "hard-to-
value" asset in order to obtain a reduction in gift or estate tax liabilities, 
should not be able to use the federal fisc to have the government value 
family entity membership units. Under Robinette, when a donor creates an 
unmarketable FLP interest from marketable assets, she should not be 
entitled to use a defined value clause on the rationale that the property is 
difficult to value. Thus, the use of a defined value clause in the FLP context 
difference. Moreover, the price-adjustment clause that was upheld in King v. United States, 545 F.2d 
700, 705 (10th Cir. (976) involved a sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business and one lacking 
donative intent-in sharp contrast to a defined value clause in a gift ofFLP interests to family members. 
192 Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 185-86 (1943). 
193Id. at 188. 
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differs in another way from pecuniary formula marital deduction clauses: 
the valuation complexities as in Robinette were taxpayer made; the 
unknown variables, like the exemption amount at a decedent's death, 
depend on Congress' actions-not the taxpayer's.194 
Finally, regarding those FLP defined value cases that incorporate a 
charity as a potential donee, as briefly mentioned already,195 while there 
may be a clear congressional policy is to encourage charitable gifts,196 any 
excess over amounts that pass to a charity do not have the charitable intent 
required under American Bar Endowment. If the value of the FLP interests 
is equal to or less than the fixed amount under the defined value clause, the 
taxpayers will make no charitable transfer. It is only where the taxpayers 
have undervalued their taxable gifts to family members that any charitable 
donation results. The taxpayers' primary objective is to avoid an audit and 
evade gift taxes for their actually larger non-charitable transfers. Only 
secondarily, if "caught," do the taxpayers intend a charitable gift. With any 
donation or charitable gift value purely speculative at the time the FLP 
interests are transferred to family members, and with the taxpayer's main 
purpose to avoid an audit and transfer more property untaxed to her family, 
there is either no or an indeterminate amount of a purposeful "charitable 
gift" intention. 197 
B. Other Safeguards 
Rejecting Procter, courts have maintained that there are plenty of 
safeguards: "countless other mechanisms [are] in place to ensure that 
fiduciaries such as executors and administrators accurately report estate 
values.,,198 Estate of Christiansen pointed to state and federal law sanctions 
194 The use of pecuniary formula marital deduction clauses have been restricted by legislation and 
government rulings. See supra Part I. 
195 See supra Part II. 
196 Estate of Christiansen v. Comm'r, 586 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2009), affg 130 T.C. 1 
(2008). 
197 See Succession of McCord v. Comro'r, 120 T.C. 358,429 (Laro, J., dissenting) (The charity 
"receives no benefit from the Court-determined increase in the value of the subject property, but 
petitioners benefit in that they are entitled to an additional charitable deduction."), rev'd, 461 F.3d 614 
(5th Cir. 2006). 
198 Estate o/Christiansen, 586 F.3d at 1065. 
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and criminal penalties for fiduciaries that breach their fiduciary duties. 199 In 
Estate of Petter, the managers of the LLC were in the position of 
fiduciaries. The foundation directors had fiduciary responsibilities, 
including "a duty to bring a lawsuit if they later found that the appraisal was 
wrong.,,200 The IRS has powers to penalize fiduciaries that misappropriate 
the assets of a charity and can threaten a charity with removing its tax-
exempt status. As the Tax Court stated in Estate of Christiansen, the IRS 
has used these weapons against the Bishop Estate defendants.z°1 Charities 
have an interest "in ensuring that the executor or administrator does not 
under-report the estate's value. Such beneficiaries, therefore, have an 
interest in serving a watchdog function.,,202 Likewise, FLP members have 
competing interests that should protect accurate valuation.203 
Is it just chance that each of the fiduciaries in McCord, Estate of 
Petter, and Wandri04 had understated the value of the transferred interest 
and none had overstated that value? Defined value clauses in the context of 
valuing an FLP interest breed valuation distortion and abuse. That lopsided 
sampling is not fortuitous. Moreover, the reality is that no beneficiary 
(taxable or exempt) of a defined value clause will sue a fiduciary for 
understating the value of his interest, charities are not likely "to look a gift 
horse in the mouth,,,20S and the government will not, and probably cannot, 
afford to bring out the big guns as it did in the mammoth and decades long 
fiasco in Bishop Estate.206 Those court statements fall flat as they sound like 
199 [d. "[T]here are sufficient mechanisms in place to promote and police the accurate reporting of 
estate values beyond just the threat of audit by the Commissioner, thereby undercutting the 
Commissioner's policy-based argument." [d. at 1065--66. In Estate a/Christiansen, the Tax Court also 
cited to various state law statutes imposing fiduciary duties applicable to executors, estate 
administrators, and foundation directors. 130 T.C. at 17. 
200 Estate 0/ Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 543, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-280. 
201 Estate a/Christiansen, 130 T.C. at 17·18; Estate 0/ Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 543,2009 
T.C.M. (RIA) ~2009-280 ("The Commissioner himself could revoke the foundations' 501(c)(3) 
exemptions ifhe found they were acting in cahoots with a tax-dodging donor."). 
202 Estate a/Christiansen, 586 F.3d at 1065. 
203 Wandry, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1478,2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2012-88. 
204 See Hendrix v. Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642, 2011 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2011-122, a case 
almost identical to McCord. 
205 See McCord, 120 T.C. at 373 n.9. 
206 See KING & Ross, supra note III. 
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hollow justifications or passing the buck when the courts should be 
acknowledging that their suggested remedies are inadequate. 
V. WHY ALL DEFINED VALUE CLAUSES ARE NOT THE SAME 
The taxpayer in Estate of Petter argued that the government 
specifically sanctions formula clauses, thus, "there can't be a general public 
policy against using formula provisions.,,207 Specifically, she cited clauses 
in a charitable remainder annuity trust (CRAT),208 a grantor retained annuity 
trust (GRAT),209 in Rev. Proc. 64_19,210 a GST tax exemption formula,211 
and a fractional formula in the gift-tax qualified-disclaimer regulations212 to 
underline the government's support for formula clauses.213 But each 
example she gave is remarkably different from a defined value clause used 
to value an FLP interest. 
With a CRAT, while the annuity is a fixed amount, the full remainder 
will actually go to a charity. With a defined value clause used to value an 
FLP interest that incorporates a charity as beneficiary for any excess value, 
there is nothing that will pass to a charity where the fixed amount is equal 
to or more than the value of the property transferred to the non-charitable 
beneficiaries. A CRAT is a highly regulated trust,214 ensuring that the 
207 Estate of Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 543, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-280. 
208 See l.R.C. § 664. 
209 See l.R.C. § 2702(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b), (d) (2005). 
210 See supra Part l.B. 
211 Treas. Reg. § 26.2632-1 (d)(l) (2005). 
212 Treas. Reg. § 25.25 I 8-3(d), Example (20) (1994). 
213 Estate of Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 543, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-280. 
214 A CRAT is a trust in which not less than 5% and not more than 50% of the initial contribution 
value of the trust must be paid annually, for no more than a twenty year fixed term or for life, to at least 
one individual who is not a charity. l.R.C. § 664(d)(I)(A); see generally H.R. REp. No. 91-413, pI. 2, at 
38-39 (1969) (discussing generally the legislative history of charitable remainder trusts). A CRAT is 
prohibited from paying any other amounts to anyone other than to a qualified charity. l.R.C. 
§ 664(d)(I)(B). A CRAT may not receive additional contributions from anyone. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-
2(b) (as amended in 2011). The CRAT's governing instrument must provide that no additional 
contributions may be made to the charitable remainder annuity trust after the initial contribution. For 
purposes of this section, all property passing to a charitable remainder annuity trust by reason of death 
of the grantor shall be considered one contribution. Id. There are income tax ordering rules for 
determining the character of CRA T distributions made to the non-charitable beneficiaries that begin as 
the least tax favored. See l.R.C. § 664(b)(I)-(4). At the end of the annuity term, the remainder, valued at 
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annuity will in fact be paid to the annuitant, which will increase, to the 
extent not consumed, the non-charitable beneficiary's gross estate. 215 A 
GRAT is similar to a CRAT?16 While both techniques may be criticized,217 
they do not share the outrageous abuse of a defined value clause in the 
context of valuing an FLP interest. 
The Petter court cited the 1964 revenue procedure as authorizing the 
employment of formula clauses in marital deduction bequests, which was 
clearly not the objective of that administrative ruling. The purpose of the 
1964 revenue procedure was in fact just the opposite. The ruling was issued 
in order to stem the abuses of pecuniary formula marital deduction 
clauses?18 The disclaimer clause formula and the GST tax exemption for-
mula are part of regulations that ensure no valuation abuse; the disclaimer 
a minimum of 10% of the value of the initial contribution to the trust must pass to a qualified charity. 
LR.C. § 664(d)(I)(C), (D). However, the remainder may also be retained by the trust in certain fonns 
and for certain purposes. LR.C. § 664(g). While the income interest of either a CRUT or a CRA T may 
be subject to a qualified contingency, the value of that interest will be computed without reference to 
that contingency. LR.C. § 664(t)(1) and (2); see also LR.e. § 664(t)(3). 
215 When the CRA T was proposed, Treasury preferred the annuity fonn because the trustee would 
no longer have an incentive to manipulate trust investments or misallocate deductions or receipts. See 
Treasury Department, Studies and Proposals, as reprinted in Tax Mgmt. Primary Sources Ser. I (BNA) 
at § 170.34 (1970). 
216 A GRAT is valued according to the rules in § 7520 of the Code. See LR.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B). 
Chapter 14 valuation rules, which include those for GRA Ts refer to, have a similar history and purpose 
with, and were meant to be consistent with, the rules allowing a deduction for split interest gifts to 
charities. See LR.C. § 170(t)(2)(A) (denying an income tax deduction for remainders given to charity 
"unless the trust is a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust (described in 
§ 664) or a pooled income fund (described in § 642(c)(5»."). A CRAT has been criticized as providing 
an immediate charitable deduction for a transfer that the charity can only enjoy some time in the future 
and avoiding capital gains on sales of trust assets so that the untaxed proceeds from those sales can 
produce more income. See Ron Shoemaker & David Jones, K. Charitable Remainder Trusts: The 
Income Deferral Abuse and Other Issues, in CPE FOR FY 1997, http:www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-
Profits/CPE-for-FY-1997, 140, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick.pdf; Wendy C. Gerzog, The 
Times They Are Not A-Changin': Reforming the Charitable Split Interest Rules (Again), 85 CHI.-KENT 
L. REv. 849, 873-76 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com!so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1484615. 
217 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, IIITH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL-PART ONE: 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROVISIONS 149 (Comm. Print 2009), but that 
restriction was not incorporated in the 2010 Act. Subsequent to Estate of Walton v. Comm'r, 115 T.e. 
589, acq., 2003-44 C.B. 964, practitioners use short tenn (2 year) GRATs, minimizing the risk of the 
grantor's death during the tenn and avoided estate tax inclusion under LR.C. § 2036(a)(1). The Obama 
Administration proposed enacting a minimum ten-year tenn for GRA Ts to even the risk of loss between 
the government and the taxpayer. Id. 
218 See supra Part LB. 
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fonnula is subject to the regulation requiring that the disclaimant must 
disclaim a proportional "slice of the pie,,219 and the GST tax exemption 
fonnula is only part of the calculations required so as not to abuse the 
. 220 exemptIOn amount. 
The Petter court chastised the government for not citing to any statute 
or regulation that prohibits fonnula clauses in making either taxable gifts or 
tax-deductible charitable donations. Further, the court criticized the 
government for not explaining how these other fonnula clauses, "which 
would tend to discourage audit and affect litigation outcomes the same way 
as Anne's formula clause, bely the Commissioner's assertion that there is 
some well-established public policy against the fonnula transfer Anne 
used.,,221 However, the other fonnula clauses do not discourage a govern-
ment audit and they do not distort value because they are further 
regulated-unlike the defined value clauses in an FLP context. 
While the court admitted that the government explained that the other 
clauses entailed circumstances "where money passing under those fonnulas 
will not escape taxation," the court stated that it was not necessarily true 
that money sheltered by the marital deduction will be taxed in the surviving 
spouse's estate.222 Although the deferral rules do not guarantee later 
taxation, they are pretty good protection for unspent deferred amounts.223 
The court compared a CRA T with a defined value clause gift of an FLP 
interest with any excess passing to a charity and considered them alike. 
That conclusion is wrong. CRA Ts are subject to a multitude of statutory 
and regulatory restrictions;224 defined value clauses in this context are not. 
Essentially, defined value clauses are not equivalent. Defined value 
clauses like those in McCord, Estate of Christiansen, Estate of Petter, and 
219 Estate of Christiansen v. Comm'r, 130 T.C. 1, 19 (2008) (citing Walshire v. United States, 288 
F.3d 342, 347 (8th Cir. 2002» (analyzing the requirement in Reg. § 25.2518-3(b) (as amended in 
1994», affd, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009). 
220 I.R.C. §§ 2631, 2632, 2641, 2642 (and regulations thereunder). 
221 Estate of Petter, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 544, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2009-280 (emphasis added). 
222Id. 
223 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 5219, 2044 (requiring the inclusion of the full value ofa QTIP trust in the 
surviving spouse's estate or taxing the surviving spouse's earlier transfer of her income interest as a gift 
of the full value of the trust). 
224 See supra note 214. 
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Wandry225 have received court approval despite their promotion of valu-
ation distortions and abuse of the tax system. In the context of valuing FLP 
interests, that is, in the context of a taxpayer taking marketable interests and 
voluntarily making those assets non-marketable in order to receive 
valuation discounts, defined value clauses encourage undervaluation of 
taxable transfers, discourage audits, overvalue transfers to charity, and are 
accorded specious charitable deductions. 
VI. REMEDIES 
Estate planners are quick to associate defined value clauses in the FLP 
context with the popular and accepted pecuniary formula marital deduction 
clauses, but those latter clauses have been restricted both by legislation and 
administrative rulings. The same is true with the formula clauses cited in 
Estate of Petter and outlined in Part V of this article. 
Courts should be mindful that both Procter and Robinette apply to this 
issue. The donor or decedent creates valuation complexity when she 
converts marketable assets into unmarketable interests by establishing an 
FLP and contributing her marketable property to that FLP. She should not 
be able then to complain that it is too difficult to value an FLP interest and 
that she needs a simple defined value clause to value her transferred 
interests. Robinette would be reluctant to give effect to a defined value 
clause under these circumstances and would leave the taxpayer with the 
consequence of having created a too difficult to value interest. With that in 
mind, a taxpayer should not be able to use a defined valuation clause to 
discourage audits, waste the government's and court's funds and time by 
effectively shifting the primary burden of its FLP interest valuation to the 
IRS, and create valuation distortions. Procter should apply to require a 
court to hold that defined value clauses in the FLP context are void as 
against public policy. 
Treasury should propose regulations that require defined value clauses 
in the context of family limited partnerships to be expressed as entity units 
and not as fixed dollar amounts. Taking a lesson from § 2056(b)(1 0), which 
reversed the holdings in Northeast Pennsylvania National Bank and Estate 
225 See Hendrix v. Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642, 20 II T.C.M. (RIA) ~ 2011-122, a case 
almost identical to McCord. 
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of Alexander, a fixed dollar amount may indeed result in valuation 
distortions. Likewise, the funding valuation manipulations created by the 
use of pecuniary fonnula marital deduction clauses that were curbed by 
Rev. Proc. 64-19 should infonn the government that defined value clauses 
in the FLP context need to be limited by an administrative ruling or 
Treasury regulation. 
Clearly, since the underlying problem began with the courts 226 
allowing FLP and related entities unwarranted discounts, Congress should 
not recognize for transfer tax purpose those family entities that do not 
primarily engage in an active business. FLP assets should be valued at their 
net asset value without non-marketability or minority discounts. The 
valuation of gifts would thereby be easy and there would be no reason to 
use a defined value clause. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Estate planners like to analogize defined value clauses used to value 
nonmarketable FLP interests to the pecuniary fonnula clauses routinely 
used to denote the values of the marital deduction trust or the credit shelter 
trust (that is, the amount exempt from transfer taxation). That ostensible 
correspondence has lulled the planner and the courts into believing that the 
two types of provisions are equivalents. The view that the two types of 
provisions are synonymous has led courts to reason that there are no 
significant valuation distortions or public policy reasons to invalidate 
defined value clauses in an FLP context. That assumed equivalence, 
however, ignores the history of valuation distortion and corrective measures 
that the government employed to make pecuniary fonnula marital 
deduction provisions acceptable to both the taxpayer and the government. 
226 See Estate of Bongard v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 95 (2005). See also James R. Repetti, Minority 
Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REv. 415 (1995); Mary L. Fellows & 
William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the 
Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1978); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. 
McCouch, Family Limited Partnerships: Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value, 6 FLA. TAX REv. 
649 (2004); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Family Limited Partnerships: The Beat Goes On, 60 TAX LAW. 
277 (2007); Wendy C. Gerzog, Valuation Discounting Techniques: Terms Gone Awry, 61 TAX LAW. 
775 (2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so\3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1286216; Brant J. Hellwig, 
On Discounted Partnership Interests and Adequate Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REv. 531 (2009); 
Wendy C. Gerzog, Bongard's Nontax Motive Test: Not Open and Schutt, 107 TAX NOTES 1711 (2005), 
available at http://papers.ssm.com/so\3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=890202. 
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Defined value clauses in the FLP context create their own valuation 
distortions and public policy issues. Like the pecuniary formula marital 
deduction clauses in the past, defined value clauses need regulation. 
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